

GEORGE CARVER

I. Background

- A. Residence
- B. College Education - degrees, honors, fellowships, scholarships

II. Qualifications

A. Present Employment

- 1. Title or Position. (SAVA) How long? (since 1966).
- 2. Responsibilities: (All Agency activities on Indochina).
- 3. Duties: (To furnish "intelligence support" to President and Senior Advisor).
- 4. What does such "intelligence support" consist of? (Explain) Are these functions substantially the same for intelligence organizations in all major countries?

B. Have you been in Vietnam?

- 1. When, and for what period of time? (1958-60, and regular visits since 1969).
- C. For how long has your work involved Vietnamese Affairs? (1957)
- D. In your present position have you worked with Senior U.S. Officials on Vietnamese Affairs? Who, and under what circumstances?

Secretary of Defense -- weekly meetings; trips to Vietnam.

JCS, State, White -- Rostow, Kissinger.

President --

Clifford Study Group and Wise Men

- E. Have you received commendations and awards for your work?

Humphrey -

Nixon -

Awards -

F. Have you published articles on Vietnam?

Foreign Affairs?

Asked to write by editor?

Identify Ex. K-81.

III. Exhibit 19

- A. Have you read and studied it?  
Did you work with the Wheeler Report in the course of your duties in 1968? When? What were the circumstances?
- B. Could possession of Ex. 19 in 1969 by a foreign nation have been prejudicial to the defense interests of the U.S.?
- C. In what ways could Ex. 19 have been advantageous to a foreign nation or prejudicial to U.S. in 1969? (List ways)
- D. Could Ext. 19 have been of advantage to a foreign nation in 1969 even if not translated into action in combat or on battlefield?
- E. Would the value of Ex. 19 to a foreign nation in 1969 have been destroyed if the information in it were wrong? Falsified?
- F. To whom in a foreign nation could this document have been of advantage in 1969? (If not done previously, ask for duties and functions of a nation's "intelligence service.")
- G. In 1969, would there have been any difference in the utility to a foreign nation's intelligence service between Ex. 19 and public materials containing similar statements? What difference?
- H. In 1969, what weight and value would a foreign nation have ascribed to Ex. 19?
  1. Would the age of Ex. 19 have rendered it of no value to foreign nations in "69"?
  2. Was the quality of NVN intelligence in 1969 such that NVN could have had no need or use for Ex. 19?

3. Could NVN in 1969 have obtained information the same as that in Ex. 19 from other sources?
  4. Would the "open" nature of U.S. society, or the large amount of information in public sources have rendered it of no value to a foreign nation in 1969? Why?
- I. Is the table on page 4 "absolutely unintelligible? (Interpret Table (PFD)).

IV. Exhibits 1-18

- A. Have you examined, and are you familiar with Exs. 1-18?
- B. Could possession of Exs. 1-18 in 1969 have been advantageous to a foreign nation?  
Could possession of Exs. 1-18 by a foreign nation in 1969 have been prejudicial to defense interests of the U.S.?
- C. In what ways could Exs. 1-18 have been of advantage to a foreign nation in 1969? (Exploitation)
  1. Discloses how U.S. does business; compromise of sources, methods, technology.
  2. Utility for authenticating public documents; exemplars for deception operations.
  3. Psychological warfare; to encourage selves, demoralize adversaries.
  4. Labor saving research, compilation, authentication, leads.
  5. Informative on U.S. views on Vietnam War, and what U.S. considers sensitive.
  6. Aid and comfort to action like NVN.
- D. In what ways could possession of Exs. 1-18 by a foreign nation in 1969 have been prejudicial to U.S. defense interests? (Impairment)
  1. Impairment of trust and confidence of sources.
  2. Impairment of frankness of USG officials in performing functions.

- E. In 1969, would there have been any difference in value to a foreign nation of the whole of Exs. 1-18 as compared with any single volume or extract from a volume? What difference?
- F. Would the presence of the footnotes in Exs. 1-18 have added significantly to the value of these documents to a foreign nation in 1969? (Note: "SC" indicates COMINT Channel)
- G. Would the classification of Exs. 1-18 have any significance to a foreign intelligence service's assessment of them? What?
- H. In terms of value to a foreign intelligence service, would books or memoirs such as Hilman's "To Move A Nation" be the equivalent of Ex. 9? Why Not?

V. Whiting Rebuttal

- A. Did changes in U.S. technology make it impossible for a foreign intelligence service in 1969 to assess U.S. intelligence capabilities on the basis of materials dated 1968 and earlier? Why not?
- B. Did infrared and electronic sensors substantially alter U.S. intelligence capabilities in Vietnam between 1965 and 1969?
- C. Is it true that finished U.S. intelligence could be of no use to a foreign nation in assessing U.S. intelligence capabilities?
  - 1. Could the finished intelligence in Exs. 1-18 have been advantageous to a foreign nation in assessing U.S. intelligence capabilities in 1969?
- D. Is it true that without raw data indicating source, time and place of collection, "it is impossible for an enemy to design a counter-intelligence response?"
  - 1. Can finished intelligence be used by a foreign nation in designing counter-intelligence responses?
  - 2. Can finished intelligence furnish an advantage to a foreign nation quite apart from whether it discloses sources or is usable for counter-intelligence purposes? In what ways?

- E. If a foreign nation was aware that the U.S. was using intelligence collection methods, such as communications intelligence, would that knowledge mean that the foreign nation could gain no further advantage by learning the results of those collection methods?
- F. Was NVN in 1969 helpless to devise counter-intelligence systems which would deny the U.S. the kind of information in Exs. 1-18?
1. Did NVN use land lines for communication in 1969?
  2. Were NVN foreign SVN capable of using only the most simple communications systems?
  3. Were NVN forces in SVN at every level capable of employing counter-measures to protect their communications?
- G. Would the information in Ex. 6, page 233, indicate to a competent foreign intelligence analyst, the collection method used?
1. Would defendants Ex. K-81, page 362, be equally revealing?
  2. What does "SC" in footnote of Ex. 6, page 222 indicate?
- H. Could disclosure of the Kosygin phone intercept and other COMINT in Ex. 17, page 93-94, have been prejudicial to U.S. defense interests in 1969? How? Advantage to foreign nation.
1. Is that material "communications intelligence?"
  2. What is the significance of the:
    - a. "President's Cipher" information?
    - b. NSA 201 and 510 group information?
  3. Is there any basis in that material to support a supposition that Kosygin's phone call was intended by him to be overheard by British or U.S.? Or that call was placed through switchboard at Claridges Hotel?  
Is information of that kind useful, even if the messages are not deciphered and read?

- I. Could the materials in Exs. 1-18 from National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) have been of advantage to a foreign nation in 1969? In what way?
- J. Is it true that a foreign intelligence analyst would attach virtually no significance to the classification indicated on Exs. 1-18.
- K. Is it true that disclosure of the information in Exs. 1-18 in 1969 could not have led to the death of a single American or allied life?
- L. In your judgement, what monetary value would Exs. 1-18 have had as intelligence information to a foreign nation in 1969?

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